The shutting down of WAMU no doubt is hastening the takeover of Wachovia. Talk about denial, insiders disputing how close it was to failing...That is simply incredible. WAMU had a portfolio of Option Arms, by far the most toxic mortgage instrument on the market today. They simply couldn't unload these assets on the open market for a price that would've allowed them to stay in business.
WaMu's desperate last days
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2008210320_wamu28.html
Regulators and insiders paint a picture of a deeply troubled bank that only reluctantly put itself up for sale, though they dispute how close it was to failing.
Monday, September 29, 2008
Saturday, September 20, 2008
Why Now?
So what caused Secretary Paulson and Fed Chairman Bernanke to act now, as opposed to next week, next month, after the election?
I believe you'll find the answer in these charts.
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Collapse and Capitulation
On September 2, see blog entry below, we warned that "we are directly in front of a major financial hurricane". Obviously, this is exactly what has occurred. Today, we are in the front end of the hurricane. This market has the potential for a full-fledged meltdown.
After the government bridge loan of $85 Billion to AIG, a loan the government tried desperately to avoid making, you've really got to ask: "Are we out of money." My guess is, there are no further bailouts coming, simply because the government cannot afford any more bailouts. Heck, I don't think they could afford this AIG bailout. They were damned if they did, and damned if they didn't.
And today's market selloff, the Nasdaq is currently -3.26%, certainly has the potential to continue to accelerate down.
Critical Long Term Support
Below is a chart illustrating an absolutely critical long term support line for the Nasdaq, connecting the October 1990 lows with the October 2002 lows. This critical support line is currently at 2037, roughly 90 points away from the current level of 2122.
After the government bridge loan of $85 Billion to AIG, a loan the government tried desperately to avoid making, you've really got to ask: "Are we out of money." My guess is, there are no further bailouts coming, simply because the government cannot afford any more bailouts. Heck, I don't think they could afford this AIG bailout. They were damned if they did, and damned if they didn't.
And today's market selloff, the Nasdaq is currently -3.26%, certainly has the potential to continue to accelerate down.
Critical Long Term Support
Below is a chart illustrating an absolutely critical long term support line for the Nasdaq, connecting the October 1990 lows with the October 2002 lows. This critical support line is currently at 2037, roughly 90 points away from the current level of 2122.
Interest Rates
Interest rates for the safest governement bonds are coming down rapidly. The rate on the government 10 Yr. Note hit 3.25% early in the trading session before climbing significantly higher, with a closing high at 3.496%. Tremendous volatility. Yesterday's low at 3.25% actually was below the January low for rates which was at 3.28%.
Today, interest rates are headed lower again, current at 3.368%.
Below is a one year chart of the 10 yr bond index.
Mortgage rates are very grudglingly following Treasury rates lower. For example, at the low in the 10 Yr in January, the 30 yr mortgage rates were actually at 4.875% at par for a brief moment (approx. 4 hours) in January. Today, they sit at 5.50%. Spreads have widened.
I am strongly recommending that those looking to refinance into a 30 year fixed rate, anything at 5.50% or lower looks extremely attractive historically. This is no time to play footsy with interest rates, there is far too much volatility in the interest rate market, and far too much uncertainty in the markets in general.
Monday, September 15, 2008
Lessons of Bear Stearns
Terrific blog entry by Barry Ritholtz at The Big Picture:
The Terrible Lessons of Bear Stearns
As Lehman Brothers (LEH) turns into a single digit financial midget on its way to zero, as Washington Mutual (WM) works its way towards a buck, as Wachovia (WB) drops more than 80% over a year, as Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) become divisions of the United States of America, and are now priced in pennies -- we need to reflect upon the ongoing lessons learned from all these interventions by Treasury, Congress and the Federal Reserve.
The lesson from the Bear Stearns' bailout -- $29 Billion in Federal Reserve bad paper guarantees -- are quite stark:
• Go Big: Don't just risk your company, risk the entire world of Finance. Modest incompetence is insufficient -- if you merely destroy your own company, you won't get rescued. You have to threaten to bring down the entire global financial system. The fear and disruption caused by a Bear collapse is why it was saved. (AIG has the right idea on this)
• If you cant Go Big, Go First: Had Lehman collapsed before Bear, then the same fear and loathing of the impact to the system might have worked to their advantage. But having been through this once before, the sting is somewhat lessened -- especially for a smaller, lets interconnected firm like LEH. (First mover advantage!)
• Threaten your counter-parties: Bear Stearns had about 9 trillion in its derivatives book, of which 40% was held by JPMorgan (JPM). Some people have argued that the Bear bailout was actually a preventative rescue of JPMorgan. Its a good strategy if your goal is a bailout -- risk bringing down someone much bigger than yourself.
• Risk an important part of the economy: If your book of derivatives is limited to some obscure and irrelevant portion of the economy, you will not get saved. On the other hand, if Mortgages are important, credit cards and auto loans are too. Securitized widget inventory is not. To use a dirty word, Lehman's exposure is "contained."
• Balance Sheets Matter: Focus on the media, complain about short sellers, obsess about PR. These are the hallmarks of a failing strategy -- and a grand waste of time. Why? Its call insolvency. ALL THAT MATTERS IS THE FIRMS' BALANCE SHEET. Lehman's liabilities exceed its assets, and they are now toast. Merrill Lynch got a lot of the junk off of its books, and got a takeover at 70% premium to its closing price. And Credit Suisse, who dumped much of its bad paper many quarters ago, is in a better tactical position than most of its peers.
• Unintended Consequences lurk everywhere: When the Fed opened up the liquidity spigots via its alphabet soup of lending facilities, the fear was of the inflationary impacts. But the bigger issue should have been Complacency. The Dick Fulds of the world said after Bear, these new facilities "put the liquidity issue to rest." Lehman got complacent once liquidity was no longer an issue -- perhaps they acted to slowly to resolve their insolvency issue in time.
Unfortunately, Moral Hazard has created terrible lessons in 2008 -- via Bear Stearns (BSC), Lehman (LEH), Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE).
The Terrible Lessons of Bear Stearns
As Lehman Brothers (LEH) turns into a single digit financial midget on its way to zero, as Washington Mutual (WM) works its way towards a buck, as Wachovia (WB) drops more than 80% over a year, as Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) become divisions of the United States of America, and are now priced in pennies -- we need to reflect upon the ongoing lessons learned from all these interventions by Treasury, Congress and the Federal Reserve.
The lesson from the Bear Stearns' bailout -- $29 Billion in Federal Reserve bad paper guarantees -- are quite stark:
• Go Big: Don't just risk your company, risk the entire world of Finance. Modest incompetence is insufficient -- if you merely destroy your own company, you won't get rescued. You have to threaten to bring down the entire global financial system. The fear and disruption caused by a Bear collapse is why it was saved. (AIG has the right idea on this)
• If you cant Go Big, Go First: Had Lehman collapsed before Bear, then the same fear and loathing of the impact to the system might have worked to their advantage. But having been through this once before, the sting is somewhat lessened -- especially for a smaller, lets interconnected firm like LEH. (First mover advantage!)
• Threaten your counter-parties: Bear Stearns had about 9 trillion in its derivatives book, of which 40% was held by JPMorgan (JPM). Some people have argued that the Bear bailout was actually a preventative rescue of JPMorgan. Its a good strategy if your goal is a bailout -- risk bringing down someone much bigger than yourself.
• Risk an important part of the economy: If your book of derivatives is limited to some obscure and irrelevant portion of the economy, you will not get saved. On the other hand, if Mortgages are important, credit cards and auto loans are too. Securitized widget inventory is not. To use a dirty word, Lehman's exposure is "contained."
• Balance Sheets Matter: Focus on the media, complain about short sellers, obsess about PR. These are the hallmarks of a failing strategy -- and a grand waste of time. Why? Its call insolvency. ALL THAT MATTERS IS THE FIRMS' BALANCE SHEET. Lehman's liabilities exceed its assets, and they are now toast. Merrill Lynch got a lot of the junk off of its books, and got a takeover at 70% premium to its closing price. And Credit Suisse, who dumped much of its bad paper many quarters ago, is in a better tactical position than most of its peers.
• Unintended Consequences lurk everywhere: When the Fed opened up the liquidity spigots via its alphabet soup of lending facilities, the fear was of the inflationary impacts. But the bigger issue should have been Complacency. The Dick Fulds of the world said after Bear, these new facilities "put the liquidity issue to rest." Lehman got complacent once liquidity was no longer an issue -- perhaps they acted to slowly to resolve their insolvency issue in time.
Unfortunately, Moral Hazard has created terrible lessons in 2008 -- via Bear Stearns (BSC), Lehman (LEH), Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE).
Sunday, September 14, 2008
Lehman Brothers - RIP 2008?
It certainly looks like Lehman Brothers is going under...The govt is drawing a line in the sand, no backstopping of Lehman debt.
Barclays Walks from Lehman Deal
In Frantic Day, Wall Street Teeters
Special Resk Reduction Trading Session Called by ISDA Re Lehman Bankruptcy
ISDA confirms a risk reduction trading session is taking place between 2 pm and 4 pm New York time today (September 14) for OTC derivatives. Product classes involved are credit, equity, rates, FX and commodity derivatives. The purpose of this session is to reduce risk associated with a potential Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. bankruptcy filing. Trades are contingent on a bankruptcy filing at or before 11:59 pm New York time, Sunday, September 14, 2008. If there is no filing, the trades cease to exist. These trades are subject to a protocol which is being distributed by ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association). Traders should execute the protocol and email a copy of the signature page to Mark New at ISDA (mnew@isda.org) with LEHMAN PROTOCOL in the subject line. Click here for Protocol Text. An explanatory statement regarding the Protocol can be found here.
MARKET PARTICIPANTS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO TRADE UNTIL AT LEAST 6:00 NEW YORK TIME. PARTIES SHOULD COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER AS TO THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TRADE LATER THAN 6:00.
International Swaps and Derivatives Association - Lehman Risk Reduction Trading Session Protocol
Bank of America walked away from Lehman, and is in talks with Merrill Lynch.
Bank of America In Talks To Buy Merrill Lynch
This news is going to hit all markets.
In my opinion, the reason that the stock market has not gone down more, until now, has been the belief that the government was going to backstop nearly every financial failure. That assumption has been taken away. First with the Fannie/Freddie deal, and now with the apparent Lehman failure, the government safety net for equity holders is gone.
We spoke a couple of weeks ago about the Elliot Wave formation calling for an upcoming stock market collapse. The last two weeks we've seen some deterioration, but, imo, the collapse begins in earnest this week (tomorrow). It could get very, very ugly.
Barclays Walks from Lehman Deal
In Frantic Day, Wall Street Teeters
Special Resk Reduction Trading Session Called by ISDA Re Lehman Bankruptcy
ISDA confirms a risk reduction trading session is taking place between 2 pm and 4 pm New York time today (September 14) for OTC derivatives. Product classes involved are credit, equity, rates, FX and commodity derivatives. The purpose of this session is to reduce risk associated with a potential Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. bankruptcy filing. Trades are contingent on a bankruptcy filing at or before 11:59 pm New York time, Sunday, September 14, 2008. If there is no filing, the trades cease to exist. These trades are subject to a protocol which is being distributed by ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association). Traders should execute the protocol and email a copy of the signature page to Mark New at ISDA (mnew@isda.org) with LEHMAN PROTOCOL in the subject line. Click here for Protocol Text. An explanatory statement regarding the Protocol can be found here.
MARKET PARTICIPANTS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO TRADE UNTIL AT LEAST 6:00 NEW YORK TIME. PARTIES SHOULD COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER AS TO THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TRADE LATER THAN 6:00.
International Swaps and Derivatives Association - Lehman Risk Reduction Trading Session Protocol
Bank of America walked away from Lehman, and is in talks with Merrill Lynch.
Bank of America In Talks To Buy Merrill Lynch
This news is going to hit all markets.
In my opinion, the reason that the stock market has not gone down more, until now, has been the belief that the government was going to backstop nearly every financial failure. That assumption has been taken away. First with the Fannie/Freddie deal, and now with the apparent Lehman failure, the government safety net for equity holders is gone.
We spoke a couple of weeks ago about the Elliot Wave formation calling for an upcoming stock market collapse. The last two weeks we've seen some deterioration, but, imo, the collapse begins in earnest this week (tomorrow). It could get very, very ugly.
Sunday, September 7, 2008
A First Look Inside the Fannie / Freddie Bailout Plan
A First Look Inside the Fannie / Freddie Bailout Plan
http://seekingalpha.com/article/94304-a-first-look-inside-the-fannie-freddie-bailout-plan
Paul Kedrosky
posted on: September 07, 2008
Details on the just-announced Fannie/Freddie bailout plans were initially scant, but the OFHEO and Treasury websites now have most of what you're looking for.
http://seekingalpha.com/article/94304-a-first-look-inside-the-fannie-freddie-bailout-plan
Paul Kedrosky
posted on: September 07, 2008
Details on the just-announced Fannie/Freddie bailout plans were initially scant, but the OFHEO and Treasury websites now have most of what you're looking for.
Here is the gist:
1. The two mortgage giants will open Monday under Treasury control
2. New CEOs and boards are inbound
3. Common shareholders are being massively diluted as preferred of a preferred/warrant deal that is being held out as offering taxpayers upside.
4. The U.S. is now buying MBS securities direct from GSEs in the open market, and there is no explicit limit specified.
5. The U.S. just added a planet-sized new (red) line item on its national balance sheet.
For those of you who like more words, here is OFHEO's description of the bailout's key elements:
There are several key components of this
conservatorship:First,Monday morning the businesses will open as normal,
only with stronger backing for the holders of MBS, senior debt and subordinated debt.Second, the Enterprises will be allowed to grow their guarantee MBS books without limits and continue to purchase replacement securities for their portfolios, about $20 billion per
month without capital constraints.Third, as the conservator, FHFA will assume the power of the Board and management.
Fourth, the present CEOs will be leaving, but we have asked them to stay on to help with the transition.
Fifth, I am announcing today I have selected Herb Allison to be the new CEO of Fannie Mae and David Moffett the CEO of Freddie Mac. Herb has been the Vice Chairman of Merrill Lynch and for the last eight years chairman of TIAA-CREF. David was the Vice Chairman and CFO of US Bancorp. I appreciate the willingness of these two men to take on these tough jobs during these challenging times. Their compensation will be significantly lower than the outgoing CEOs. They will be joined by equally
strong non-executive chairmen.Sixth, at this time any other management action will be very limited. In fact, the new CEOs have agreed with me that it is very important to work with the current management teams and employees to encourage them to stay and to continue to make important improvements to the Enterprises.
Seventh, in order to conserve over $2 billion in capital every year, the common stock and preferred stock dividends will be eliminated, but the common and all preferred stocks will continue to remain outstanding. Subordinated debt interest and principal payments will continue to be made.
Eighth, all political activities -- including all lobbying -- will be halted immediately. We will review the charitable activities.
Lastly and very importantly, there will be the financing and investing relationship with the U.S. Treasury, which Secretary Paulson will be discussing. We believe that these facilities will provide the critically needed support to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and importantly the liquidity of the mortgage market.
One of the three facilities he will be mentioning is a secured liquidity facility which will be not only for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but also for the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks
that FHFA also regulates. The Federal Home Loan Banks have performed remarkably well over the last year as they have a different business model than Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac and a different capital structure that grows as their lending activity grows. They are joint and severally liable for the Bank System’s debt obligations and all but one of the 12 are profitable. Therefore, it is very unlikely that they will use the facility.
And more here from the WSJ, straight from Treasury's description of the shareholder-diluting PSPA:
The Treasury said its senior preferred stock purchase agreement includes and
upfront $1 billion issuance of senior preferred stock with a 10% coupon from
each GSE, quarterly dividend payments, warrants representing an ownership stake
of 79.9% in each firm going forward, and a quarterly fee starting in 2010.
Lots more details to come, I have to think. The market is going to initially swoon for this, but Tuesday will be interesting as the ripple effects hit.
Fannie, Freddie Capital Concerns Prompt Paulson Plan
Fannie, Freddie Capital Concerns Prompt Paulson Plan
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aMX336c2lWGQ&refer=worldwide
By Dawn Kopecki and Alison Vekshin
Sept. 7 (Bloomberg) -- Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson decided to take control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac after a review found the beleaguered mortgage-finance companies used accounting methods that inflated their capital, according to people with knowledge of the decision.
Paulson will hold a press conference at 11 a.m. today in Washington, according to a statement. Morgan Stanley, hired by the Treasury to probe the companies' finances, concluded the accounting, while legal, enabled Freddie, and to a lesser extent Fannie, to overstate the value of their reserves, according to the people who declined to be identified because the findings are confidential.
The Treasury plans to put Fannie and Freddie into a so- called conservatorship and pump capital into the companies, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank said in an interview yesterday. The government would make periodic capital injections by buying convertible preferred shares or warrants, according to a person briefed on the plan. Paulson is seeking to end a crisis of confidence in the companies sparked by concern the companies didn't have enough capital to weather the biggest housing slump since the Great Depression.
The Treasury was ``convinced that the markets simply wouldn't respond until after something like this,'' said Frank, who was brief by Paulson. ``I think it's an important combination.''
Debt Holders Protected
Paulson gathered Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Federal Housing Finance Agency Director James Lockhart, Fannie Chief Executive Officer Daniel Mudd and Freddie CEO Richard Syron to discuss the plan to take control of the government- sponsored enterprises, which have operated as private shareholder-owned corporations for almost 40 years. Lockhart will also speak at today's press conference, the statement said.
Holders of the companies' common and preferred stock are ``very unlikely to come out of this at all happy,'' and the chief executive officers will be forced out, Frank said. Senior and subordinated debt holders will likely be protected, said other people who were briefed on the plan.
Fannie and Freddie own or guarantee almost half of the $12 trillion in U.S. home loans and the government had been leaning on the companies to help pull the economy out of the housing crisis. Instead, they got caught in the same slump that left the world's banks with more than $500 billion of losses since the collapse of the subprime-mortgage market last year.
Rising Costs
Concern over the companies' capital pushed their borrowing costs to record levels over U.S. Treasuries, sent their common and preferred stocks tumbling and boosted mortgage rates. Washington-based Fannie is down about 66 percent in New York Stock Exchange trading since the end of June. McLean, Virginia- based Freddie has fallen about 69 percent.
Paulson met with Mudd, 50, and Syron, 64, Sept. 5 to tell them of the decision to remove the executives from their jobs, according to two people briefed on the discussions. Mudd, who replaced three top executives almost two weeks ago, is negotiating with regulators to stay on in a consultative role for several months, according to people with knowledge of the talks.
A government takeover would be the latest attempt to blunt the impact of the yearlong credit crisis, after the Fed provided financing for Bear Stearns Cos.'s takeover by JPMorgan Chase & Co.
``They have to open their wallet,'' Bill Gross, manager of the world's biggest bond fund at Newport Beach, California-based Pacific Investment Management Co. About 61 percent of Gross's holdings were mortgage-backed securities as of June 30, mostly debt guaranteed by Fannie, Freddie or government agency Ginnie Mae, according to data on Pimco's Web site.
Obama, McCain Briefed
Pimco and other large investors may put in their own money once the Treasury decides to inject government funds, Gross said Sept. 5 in a Bloomberg Television interview.
Paulson hired Morgan Stanley a month ago to advise on Fannie and Freddie. Mark Lake, a spokesman for Morgan Stanley, declined to comment. Paulson also consulted with Bank of America Corp. Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lewis on his plan, according to people with knowledge of the talks. Bank of America spokesman Scott Silvestri declined to comment.
The Treasury briefed Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama yesterday and has contacted Republican contender John McCain's staff. Officials also discussed the plans with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd.
``We are making progress on our work with Morgan Stanley, FHFA and the Fed,'' Treasury spokeswoman Brookly Mclaughlin said Sept. 5 in Washington, declining to comment on any specific plans. FHFA spokeswoman Stefanie Mullin declined to comment.
Losses Grow
Fannie was created by the government in 1938 as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. Freddie was chartered in 1970 to compete with Fannie.
As losses on the mortgages grew late last year, the companies recorded $14.9 billion in combined net losses, eating into their capital. Fannie raised $14.4 billion since November and Freddie sold $6 billion of preferred securities. Plans for a $5.5 billion sale were delayed as the company's fortunes sank.
Fannie had $47 billion of capital as of June 30, according to company filings. The company is required by its regulator to hold $37.5 billion. Freddie's capital stood at $37.1 billion, compared with a requirement of $34.5 billion, filings show.
Critics including former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and Richmond Federal Reserve Bank President Jeffrey Lacker have called for the companies to be nationalized. William Poole, the former head of the St. Louis Fed said in July that Freddie Mac is technically insolvent and Fannie Mae's fair value may be negative next quarter.
Fed Involvement
Fannie and Freddie dropped in after-hours trading on Sept. 5. Fannie fell $2.25, or 32 percent, to $4.79 at 5:50 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange trading and Freddie slumped $1.40, or 27 percent, to $3.70. The market value of Fannie's $21.7 billion in preferreds had dropped 64 percent to $7.87 billion late last month, according to Friedman Billings & Ramsey & Co. The market value of Freddie's $14.1 billion in preferreds has fallen 61 percent to $5.44 billion.
Fannie's market capitalization is now $7.6 billion, down from $38.9 billion at the end of last year. Freddie's has fallen to $3.3 billion, from $22 billion over the same period.
Bernanke participated in the meetings because the central bank was given a consultative role in overseeing Fannie's and Freddie's capital under legislation approved in July. Paulson's decision won the approval of Bernanke and Lockhart, the person briefed on the discussions said.
Conservatorship
The FHFA has the authority to place Fannie or Freddie into conservatorships or receiverships under the law. The legislation that President George W. Bush signed July 30 also gave the Treasury the power through the end of next year to extend unlimited credit to or make equity purchases in the firms.
Under a conservatorship, the authorities would aim to preserve Fannie and Freddie assets, rather than dispose of them, the law says.
The FHFA was scheduled to release its assessment of the companies' capital levels as early as last week as part of a quarterly appraisal of their finances.
Analysts have speculated that the Treasury would wipe out common shareholders, while seeking to shield preferred stockowners from total loss. Fannie and Freddie preferred shares are typically owned by banks and insurance companies. Their $5.2 trillion of debt outstanding is held by investors including Asian central banks, and would probably be guaranteed, analysts said.
Senior Position
Frank said the federal government will take a senior repayment position to ``all shareholders, preferred and common.''
The Treasury is ``going beyond no dividends, I believe, in terms of what's going to happen to the shareholders,'' Frank said. ``I think shareholders are going to find themselves in a very subordinate position.''
``Treasury's main concern is the debt markets, and if it was to say that it will do whatever is necessary to keep Fannie and Freddie running, the better it is for their funding,'' said Alex Pollock, fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington and former president of the Chicago Federal Home Loan Bank.
Fannie and Freddie sell billions of dollars of bonds each month to pay maturing debt. As of mid-August the companies had $223 billion of debt to refinance by the end of the quarter.
While they have continued to issue securities, Fannie and Freddie have paid record yields over U.S. Treasuries to attract investors reluctant to take on the debt even with its implicit backing from the government.
Freddie sold $3 billion of two-year reference notes this week at 3.229 percent, or 97.5 basis points more than Treasuries of similar maturity, the highest since at least 1998, based on company and market data compiled by Bloomberg.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aMX336c2lWGQ&refer=worldwide
By Dawn Kopecki and Alison Vekshin
Sept. 7 (Bloomberg) -- Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson decided to take control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac after a review found the beleaguered mortgage-finance companies used accounting methods that inflated their capital, according to people with knowledge of the decision.
Paulson will hold a press conference at 11 a.m. today in Washington, according to a statement. Morgan Stanley, hired by the Treasury to probe the companies' finances, concluded the accounting, while legal, enabled Freddie, and to a lesser extent Fannie, to overstate the value of their reserves, according to the people who declined to be identified because the findings are confidential.
The Treasury plans to put Fannie and Freddie into a so- called conservatorship and pump capital into the companies, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank said in an interview yesterday. The government would make periodic capital injections by buying convertible preferred shares or warrants, according to a person briefed on the plan. Paulson is seeking to end a crisis of confidence in the companies sparked by concern the companies didn't have enough capital to weather the biggest housing slump since the Great Depression.
The Treasury was ``convinced that the markets simply wouldn't respond until after something like this,'' said Frank, who was brief by Paulson. ``I think it's an important combination.''
Debt Holders Protected
Paulson gathered Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Federal Housing Finance Agency Director James Lockhart, Fannie Chief Executive Officer Daniel Mudd and Freddie CEO Richard Syron to discuss the plan to take control of the government- sponsored enterprises, which have operated as private shareholder-owned corporations for almost 40 years. Lockhart will also speak at today's press conference, the statement said.
Holders of the companies' common and preferred stock are ``very unlikely to come out of this at all happy,'' and the chief executive officers will be forced out, Frank said. Senior and subordinated debt holders will likely be protected, said other people who were briefed on the plan.
Fannie and Freddie own or guarantee almost half of the $12 trillion in U.S. home loans and the government had been leaning on the companies to help pull the economy out of the housing crisis. Instead, they got caught in the same slump that left the world's banks with more than $500 billion of losses since the collapse of the subprime-mortgage market last year.
Rising Costs
Concern over the companies' capital pushed their borrowing costs to record levels over U.S. Treasuries, sent their common and preferred stocks tumbling and boosted mortgage rates. Washington-based Fannie is down about 66 percent in New York Stock Exchange trading since the end of June. McLean, Virginia- based Freddie has fallen about 69 percent.
Paulson met with Mudd, 50, and Syron, 64, Sept. 5 to tell them of the decision to remove the executives from their jobs, according to two people briefed on the discussions. Mudd, who replaced three top executives almost two weeks ago, is negotiating with regulators to stay on in a consultative role for several months, according to people with knowledge of the talks.
A government takeover would be the latest attempt to blunt the impact of the yearlong credit crisis, after the Fed provided financing for Bear Stearns Cos.'s takeover by JPMorgan Chase & Co.
``They have to open their wallet,'' Bill Gross, manager of the world's biggest bond fund at Newport Beach, California-based Pacific Investment Management Co. About 61 percent of Gross's holdings were mortgage-backed securities as of June 30, mostly debt guaranteed by Fannie, Freddie or government agency Ginnie Mae, according to data on Pimco's Web site.
Obama, McCain Briefed
Pimco and other large investors may put in their own money once the Treasury decides to inject government funds, Gross said Sept. 5 in a Bloomberg Television interview.
Paulson hired Morgan Stanley a month ago to advise on Fannie and Freddie. Mark Lake, a spokesman for Morgan Stanley, declined to comment. Paulson also consulted with Bank of America Corp. Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lewis on his plan, according to people with knowledge of the talks. Bank of America spokesman Scott Silvestri declined to comment.
The Treasury briefed Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama yesterday and has contacted Republican contender John McCain's staff. Officials also discussed the plans with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd.
``We are making progress on our work with Morgan Stanley, FHFA and the Fed,'' Treasury spokeswoman Brookly Mclaughlin said Sept. 5 in Washington, declining to comment on any specific plans. FHFA spokeswoman Stefanie Mullin declined to comment.
Losses Grow
Fannie was created by the government in 1938 as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. Freddie was chartered in 1970 to compete with Fannie.
As losses on the mortgages grew late last year, the companies recorded $14.9 billion in combined net losses, eating into their capital. Fannie raised $14.4 billion since November and Freddie sold $6 billion of preferred securities. Plans for a $5.5 billion sale were delayed as the company's fortunes sank.
Fannie had $47 billion of capital as of June 30, according to company filings. The company is required by its regulator to hold $37.5 billion. Freddie's capital stood at $37.1 billion, compared with a requirement of $34.5 billion, filings show.
Critics including former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and Richmond Federal Reserve Bank President Jeffrey Lacker have called for the companies to be nationalized. William Poole, the former head of the St. Louis Fed said in July that Freddie Mac is technically insolvent and Fannie Mae's fair value may be negative next quarter.
Fed Involvement
Fannie and Freddie dropped in after-hours trading on Sept. 5. Fannie fell $2.25, or 32 percent, to $4.79 at 5:50 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange trading and Freddie slumped $1.40, or 27 percent, to $3.70. The market value of Fannie's $21.7 billion in preferreds had dropped 64 percent to $7.87 billion late last month, according to Friedman Billings & Ramsey & Co. The market value of Freddie's $14.1 billion in preferreds has fallen 61 percent to $5.44 billion.
Fannie's market capitalization is now $7.6 billion, down from $38.9 billion at the end of last year. Freddie's has fallen to $3.3 billion, from $22 billion over the same period.
Bernanke participated in the meetings because the central bank was given a consultative role in overseeing Fannie's and Freddie's capital under legislation approved in July. Paulson's decision won the approval of Bernanke and Lockhart, the person briefed on the discussions said.
Conservatorship
The FHFA has the authority to place Fannie or Freddie into conservatorships or receiverships under the law. The legislation that President George W. Bush signed July 30 also gave the Treasury the power through the end of next year to extend unlimited credit to or make equity purchases in the firms.
Under a conservatorship, the authorities would aim to preserve Fannie and Freddie assets, rather than dispose of them, the law says.
The FHFA was scheduled to release its assessment of the companies' capital levels as early as last week as part of a quarterly appraisal of their finances.
Analysts have speculated that the Treasury would wipe out common shareholders, while seeking to shield preferred stockowners from total loss. Fannie and Freddie preferred shares are typically owned by banks and insurance companies. Their $5.2 trillion of debt outstanding is held by investors including Asian central banks, and would probably be guaranteed, analysts said.
Senior Position
Frank said the federal government will take a senior repayment position to ``all shareholders, preferred and common.''
The Treasury is ``going beyond no dividends, I believe, in terms of what's going to happen to the shareholders,'' Frank said. ``I think shareholders are going to find themselves in a very subordinate position.''
``Treasury's main concern is the debt markets, and if it was to say that it will do whatever is necessary to keep Fannie and Freddie running, the better it is for their funding,'' said Alex Pollock, fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington and former president of the Chicago Federal Home Loan Bank.
Fannie and Freddie sell billions of dollars of bonds each month to pay maturing debt. As of mid-August the companies had $223 billion of debt to refinance by the end of the quarter.
While they have continued to issue securities, Fannie and Freddie have paid record yields over U.S. Treasuries to attract investors reluctant to take on the debt even with its implicit backing from the government.
Freddie sold $3 billion of two-year reference notes this week at 3.229 percent, or 97.5 basis points more than Treasuries of similar maturity, the highest since at least 1998, based on company and market data compiled by Bloomberg.
Fannie Freddie Bailout Announced
11:31 AM Fact sheets from Treasury (.pdfs): FHFA Conservatorship • Treasury Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement • Treasury MBS Purchase Program • Treasury GSE Credit Facility
11:31 AM FHFA names Herb Allison, formerly CEO of TIAA-CREF, to head Fannie Mae (FNM), and David Moffett, formerly CFO of US Bancorp, to lead Freddie Mac (FRE).
11:25 AM Here's the Treasury's official statement on the bailout.
September 7, 2008hp-1129
Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers
Washington, DC-- Good morning. I'm joined here by Jim Lockhart, Director of the new independent regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA.
In July, Congress granted the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and FHFA new authorities with respect to the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Since that time, we have closely monitored financial market and business conditions and have analyzed in great detail the current financial condition of the GSEs – including the ability of the GSEs to weather a variety of market conditions going forward. As a result of this work, we have determined that it is necessary to take action.
Since this difficult period for the GSEs began, I have clearly stated three critical objectives: providing stability to financial markets, supporting the availability of mortgage finance, and protecting taxpayers – both by minimizing the near term costs to the taxpayer and by setting policymakers on a course to resolve the systemic risk created by the inherent conflict in the GSE structure.
Based on what we have learned about these institutions over the last four weeks – including what we learned about their capital requirements – and given the condition of financial markets today, I concluded that it would not have been in the best interest of the taxpayers for Treasury to simply make an equity investment in these enterprises in their current form.
The four steps we are announcing today are the result of detailed and thorough collaboration between FHFA, the U.S. Treasury, and the Federal Reserve.
We examined all options available, and determined that this comprehensive and complementary set of actions best meets our three objectives of market stability, mortgage availability and taxpayer protection.
Throughout this process we have been in close communication with the GSEs themselves. I have also consulted with Members of Congress from both parties and I appreciate their support as FHFA, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have moved to address this difficult issue.
Before I turn to Jim to discuss the action he is taking today, let me make clear that these two institutions are unique. They operate solely in the mortgage market and are therefore more exposed than other financial institutions to the housing correction. Their statutory capital requirements are thin and poorly defined as compared to other institutions. Nothing about our actions today in any way reflects a changed view of the housing correction or of the strength of other U.S. financial institutions.
***
I support the Director's decision as necessary and appropriate and had advised him that conservatorship was the only form in which I would commit taxpayer money to the GSEs.
I appreciate the productive cooperation we have received from the boards and the management of both GSEs. I attribute the need for today's action primarily to the inherent conflict and flawed business model embedded in the GSE structure, and to the ongoing housing correction. GSE managements and their Boards are responsible for neither. New CEOs supported by new non-executive Chairmen have taken over management of the enterprises, and we hope and expect that the vast majority of key professionals will remain in their jobs. I am particularly pleased that the departing CEOs, Dan Mudd and Dick Syron, have agreed to stay on for a period to help with the transition.
I have long said that the housing correction poses the biggest risk to our economy. It is a drag on our economic growth, and at the heart of the turmoil and stress for our financial markets and financial institutions. Our economy and our markets will not recover until the bulk of this housing correction is behind us. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are critical to turning the corner on housing. Therefore, the primary mission of these enterprises now will be to proactively work to increase the availability of mortgage finance, including by examining the guaranty fee structure with an eye toward mortgage affordability.
To promote stability in the secondary mortgage market and lower the cost of funding, the GSEs will modestly increase their MBS portfolios through the end of 2009. Then, to address systemic risk, in 2010 their portfolios will begin to be gradually reduced at the rate of 10 percent per year, largely through natural run off, eventually stabilizing at a lower, less risky size.
Treasury has taken three additional steps to complement FHFA's decision to place both enterprises in conservatorship. First, Treasury and FHFA have established Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, contractual agreements between the Treasury and the conserved entities. Under these agreements, Treasury will ensure that each company maintains a positive net worth. These agreements support market stability by providing additional security and clarity to GSE debt holders – senior and subordinated – and support mortgage availability by providing additional confidence to investors in GSE mortgage backed securities. This commitment will eliminate any mandatory triggering of receivership and will ensure that the conserved entities have the ability to fulfill their financial obligations. It is more efficient than a one-time equity injection, because it will be used only as needed and on terms that Treasury has set. With this agreement, Treasury receives senior preferred equity shares and warrants that protect taxpayers. Additionally, under the terms of the agreement, common and preferred shareholders bear losses ahead of the new government senior preferred shares.
These Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements were made necessary by the ambiguities in the GSE Congressional charters, which have been perceived to indicate government support for agency debt and guaranteed MBS. Our nation has tolerated these ambiguities for too long, and as a result GSE debt and MBS are held by central banks and investors throughout the United States and around the world who believe them to be virtually risk-free. Because the U.S. Government created these ambiguities, we have a responsibility to both avert and ultimately address the systemic risk now posed by the scale and breadth of the holdings of GSE debt and MBS.
Market discipline is best served when shareholders bear both the risk and the reward of their investment. While conservatorship does not eliminate the common stock, it does place common shareholders last in terms of claims on the assets of the enterprise.
Similarly, conservatorship does not eliminate the outstanding preferred stock, but does place preferred shareholders second, after the common shareholders, in absorbing losses. The federal banking agencies are assessing the exposures of banks and thrifts to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The agencies believe that, while many institutions hold common or preferred shares of these two GSEs, only a limited number of smaller institutions have holdings that are significant compared to their capital.
The agencies encourage depository institutions to contact their primary federal regulator if they believe that losses on their holdings of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac common or preferred shares, whether realized or unrealized, are likely to reduce their regulatory capital below "well capitalized." The banking agencies are prepared to work with the affected institutions to develop capital restoration plans consistent with the capital regulations.
Preferred stock investors should recognize that the GSEs are unlike any other financial institutions and consequently GSE preferred stocks are not a good proxy for financial institution preferred stock more broadly. By stabilizing the GSEs so they can better perform their mission, today's action should accelerate stabilization in the housing market, ultimately benefiting financial institutions. The broader market for preferred stock issuance should continue to remain available for well-capitalized institutions.
The second step Treasury is taking today is the establishment of a new secured lending credit facility which will be available to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. Given the combination of actions we are taking, including the Preferred Share Purchase Agreements, we expect the GSEs to be in a stronger position to fund their regular business activities in the capital markets. This facility is intended to serve as an ultimate liquidity backstop, in essence, implementing the temporary liquidity backstop authority granted by Congress in July, and will be available until those authorities expire in December 2009.
Finally, to further support the availability of mortgage financing for millions of Americans, Treasury is initiating a temporary program to purchase GSE MBS. During this ongoing housing correction, the GSE portfolios have been constrained, both by their own capital situation and by regulatory efforts to address systemic risk. As the GSEs have grappled with their difficulties, we've seen mortgage rate spreads to Treasuries widen, making mortgages less affordable for homebuyers. While the GSEs are expected to moderately increase the size of their portfolios over the next 15 months through prudent mortgage purchases, complementary government efforts can aid mortgage affordability. Treasury will begin this new program later this month, investing in new GSE MBS. Additional purchases will be made as deemed appropriate. Given that Treasury can hold these securities to maturity, the spreads between Treasury issuances and GSE MBS indicate that there is no reason to expect taxpayer losses from this program, and, in fact, it could produce gains. This program will also expire with the Treasury's temporary authorities in December 2009.
Together, this four part program is the best means of protecting our markets and the taxpayers from the systemic risk posed by the current financial condition of the GSEs. Because the GSEs are in conservatorship, they will no longer be managed with a strategy to maximize common shareholder returns, a strategy which historically encouraged risk-taking. The Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements minimize current cash outlays, and give taxpayers a large stake in the future value of these entities. In the end, the ultimate cost to the taxpayer will depend on the business results of the GSEs going forward. To that end, the steps we have taken to support the GSE debt and to support the mortgage market will together improve the housing market, the US economy and the GSEs' business outlook.
Through the four actions we have taken today, FHFA and Treasury have acted on the responsibilities we have to protect the stability of the financial markets, including the mortgage market, and to protect the taxpayer to the maximum extent possible.
And let me make clear what today's actions mean for Americans and their families. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are so large and so interwoven in our financial system that a failure of either of them would cause great turmoil in our financial markets here at home and around the globe. This turmoil would directly and negatively impact household wealth: from family budgets, to home values, to savings for college and retirement. A failure would affect the ability of Americans to get home loans, auto loans and other consumer credit and business finance. And a failure would be harmful to economic growth and job creation. That is why we have taken these actions today.
While we expect these four steps to provide greater stability and certainty to market participants and provide long-term clarity to investors in GSE debt and MBS securities, our collective work is not complete. At the end of next year, the Treasury temporary authorities will expire, the GSE portfolios will begin to gradually run off, and the GSEs will begin to pay the government a fee to compensate taxpayers for the on-going support provided by the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements. Together, these factors should give momentum and urgency to the reform cause. Policymakers must view this next period as a "time out" where we have stabilized the GSEs while we decide their future role and structure.
Because the GSEs are Congressionally-chartered, only Congress can address the inherent conflict of attempting to serve both shareholders and a public mission. The new Congress and the next Administration must decide what role government in general, and these entities in particular, should play in the housing market. There is a consensus today that these enterprises pose a systemic risk and they cannot continue in their current form. Government support needs to be either explicit or non-existent, and structured to resolve the conflict between public and private purposes. And policymakers must address the issue of systemic risk. I recognize that there are strong differences of opinion over the role of government in supporting housing, but under any course policymakers choose, there are ways to structure these entities in order to address market stability in the transition and limit systemic risk and conflict of purposes for the long-term. We will make a grave error if we don't use this time out to permanently address the structural issues presented by the GSEs.
In the weeks to come, I will describe my views on long term reform. I look forward to engaging in that timely and necessary debate.
-30-
REPORTS
FHFA Director Lockhart Remarks on Housing GSE Actions
Fact Sheet: FHFA Conservatorship
Fact Sheet: Treasury Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
Fact Sheet: Treasury MBS Purchase Program
Fact Sheet: Treasury GSE Credit Facility
11:31 AM FHFA names Herb Allison, formerly CEO of TIAA-CREF, to head Fannie Mae (FNM), and David Moffett, formerly CFO of US Bancorp, to lead Freddie Mac (FRE).
11:25 AM Here's the Treasury's official statement on the bailout.
September 7, 2008hp-1129
Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers
Washington, DC-- Good morning. I'm joined here by Jim Lockhart, Director of the new independent regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA.
In July, Congress granted the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and FHFA new authorities with respect to the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Since that time, we have closely monitored financial market and business conditions and have analyzed in great detail the current financial condition of the GSEs – including the ability of the GSEs to weather a variety of market conditions going forward. As a result of this work, we have determined that it is necessary to take action.
Since this difficult period for the GSEs began, I have clearly stated three critical objectives: providing stability to financial markets, supporting the availability of mortgage finance, and protecting taxpayers – both by minimizing the near term costs to the taxpayer and by setting policymakers on a course to resolve the systemic risk created by the inherent conflict in the GSE structure.
Based on what we have learned about these institutions over the last four weeks – including what we learned about their capital requirements – and given the condition of financial markets today, I concluded that it would not have been in the best interest of the taxpayers for Treasury to simply make an equity investment in these enterprises in their current form.
The four steps we are announcing today are the result of detailed and thorough collaboration between FHFA, the U.S. Treasury, and the Federal Reserve.
We examined all options available, and determined that this comprehensive and complementary set of actions best meets our three objectives of market stability, mortgage availability and taxpayer protection.
Throughout this process we have been in close communication with the GSEs themselves. I have also consulted with Members of Congress from both parties and I appreciate their support as FHFA, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have moved to address this difficult issue.
Before I turn to Jim to discuss the action he is taking today, let me make clear that these two institutions are unique. They operate solely in the mortgage market and are therefore more exposed than other financial institutions to the housing correction. Their statutory capital requirements are thin and poorly defined as compared to other institutions. Nothing about our actions today in any way reflects a changed view of the housing correction or of the strength of other U.S. financial institutions.
***
I support the Director's decision as necessary and appropriate and had advised him that conservatorship was the only form in which I would commit taxpayer money to the GSEs.
I appreciate the productive cooperation we have received from the boards and the management of both GSEs. I attribute the need for today's action primarily to the inherent conflict and flawed business model embedded in the GSE structure, and to the ongoing housing correction. GSE managements and their Boards are responsible for neither. New CEOs supported by new non-executive Chairmen have taken over management of the enterprises, and we hope and expect that the vast majority of key professionals will remain in their jobs. I am particularly pleased that the departing CEOs, Dan Mudd and Dick Syron, have agreed to stay on for a period to help with the transition.
I have long said that the housing correction poses the biggest risk to our economy. It is a drag on our economic growth, and at the heart of the turmoil and stress for our financial markets and financial institutions. Our economy and our markets will not recover until the bulk of this housing correction is behind us. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are critical to turning the corner on housing. Therefore, the primary mission of these enterprises now will be to proactively work to increase the availability of mortgage finance, including by examining the guaranty fee structure with an eye toward mortgage affordability.
To promote stability in the secondary mortgage market and lower the cost of funding, the GSEs will modestly increase their MBS portfolios through the end of 2009. Then, to address systemic risk, in 2010 their portfolios will begin to be gradually reduced at the rate of 10 percent per year, largely through natural run off, eventually stabilizing at a lower, less risky size.
Treasury has taken three additional steps to complement FHFA's decision to place both enterprises in conservatorship. First, Treasury and FHFA have established Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, contractual agreements between the Treasury and the conserved entities. Under these agreements, Treasury will ensure that each company maintains a positive net worth. These agreements support market stability by providing additional security and clarity to GSE debt holders – senior and subordinated – and support mortgage availability by providing additional confidence to investors in GSE mortgage backed securities. This commitment will eliminate any mandatory triggering of receivership and will ensure that the conserved entities have the ability to fulfill their financial obligations. It is more efficient than a one-time equity injection, because it will be used only as needed and on terms that Treasury has set. With this agreement, Treasury receives senior preferred equity shares and warrants that protect taxpayers. Additionally, under the terms of the agreement, common and preferred shareholders bear losses ahead of the new government senior preferred shares.
These Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements were made necessary by the ambiguities in the GSE Congressional charters, which have been perceived to indicate government support for agency debt and guaranteed MBS. Our nation has tolerated these ambiguities for too long, and as a result GSE debt and MBS are held by central banks and investors throughout the United States and around the world who believe them to be virtually risk-free. Because the U.S. Government created these ambiguities, we have a responsibility to both avert and ultimately address the systemic risk now posed by the scale and breadth of the holdings of GSE debt and MBS.
Market discipline is best served when shareholders bear both the risk and the reward of their investment. While conservatorship does not eliminate the common stock, it does place common shareholders last in terms of claims on the assets of the enterprise.
Similarly, conservatorship does not eliminate the outstanding preferred stock, but does place preferred shareholders second, after the common shareholders, in absorbing losses. The federal banking agencies are assessing the exposures of banks and thrifts to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The agencies believe that, while many institutions hold common or preferred shares of these two GSEs, only a limited number of smaller institutions have holdings that are significant compared to their capital.
The agencies encourage depository institutions to contact their primary federal regulator if they believe that losses on their holdings of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac common or preferred shares, whether realized or unrealized, are likely to reduce their regulatory capital below "well capitalized." The banking agencies are prepared to work with the affected institutions to develop capital restoration plans consistent with the capital regulations.
Preferred stock investors should recognize that the GSEs are unlike any other financial institutions and consequently GSE preferred stocks are not a good proxy for financial institution preferred stock more broadly. By stabilizing the GSEs so they can better perform their mission, today's action should accelerate stabilization in the housing market, ultimately benefiting financial institutions. The broader market for preferred stock issuance should continue to remain available for well-capitalized institutions.
The second step Treasury is taking today is the establishment of a new secured lending credit facility which will be available to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. Given the combination of actions we are taking, including the Preferred Share Purchase Agreements, we expect the GSEs to be in a stronger position to fund their regular business activities in the capital markets. This facility is intended to serve as an ultimate liquidity backstop, in essence, implementing the temporary liquidity backstop authority granted by Congress in July, and will be available until those authorities expire in December 2009.
Finally, to further support the availability of mortgage financing for millions of Americans, Treasury is initiating a temporary program to purchase GSE MBS. During this ongoing housing correction, the GSE portfolios have been constrained, both by their own capital situation and by regulatory efforts to address systemic risk. As the GSEs have grappled with their difficulties, we've seen mortgage rate spreads to Treasuries widen, making mortgages less affordable for homebuyers. While the GSEs are expected to moderately increase the size of their portfolios over the next 15 months through prudent mortgage purchases, complementary government efforts can aid mortgage affordability. Treasury will begin this new program later this month, investing in new GSE MBS. Additional purchases will be made as deemed appropriate. Given that Treasury can hold these securities to maturity, the spreads between Treasury issuances and GSE MBS indicate that there is no reason to expect taxpayer losses from this program, and, in fact, it could produce gains. This program will also expire with the Treasury's temporary authorities in December 2009.
Together, this four part program is the best means of protecting our markets and the taxpayers from the systemic risk posed by the current financial condition of the GSEs. Because the GSEs are in conservatorship, they will no longer be managed with a strategy to maximize common shareholder returns, a strategy which historically encouraged risk-taking. The Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements minimize current cash outlays, and give taxpayers a large stake in the future value of these entities. In the end, the ultimate cost to the taxpayer will depend on the business results of the GSEs going forward. To that end, the steps we have taken to support the GSE debt and to support the mortgage market will together improve the housing market, the US economy and the GSEs' business outlook.
Through the four actions we have taken today, FHFA and Treasury have acted on the responsibilities we have to protect the stability of the financial markets, including the mortgage market, and to protect the taxpayer to the maximum extent possible.
And let me make clear what today's actions mean for Americans and their families. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are so large and so interwoven in our financial system that a failure of either of them would cause great turmoil in our financial markets here at home and around the globe. This turmoil would directly and negatively impact household wealth: from family budgets, to home values, to savings for college and retirement. A failure would affect the ability of Americans to get home loans, auto loans and other consumer credit and business finance. And a failure would be harmful to economic growth and job creation. That is why we have taken these actions today.
While we expect these four steps to provide greater stability and certainty to market participants and provide long-term clarity to investors in GSE debt and MBS securities, our collective work is not complete. At the end of next year, the Treasury temporary authorities will expire, the GSE portfolios will begin to gradually run off, and the GSEs will begin to pay the government a fee to compensate taxpayers for the on-going support provided by the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements. Together, these factors should give momentum and urgency to the reform cause. Policymakers must view this next period as a "time out" where we have stabilized the GSEs while we decide their future role and structure.
Because the GSEs are Congressionally-chartered, only Congress can address the inherent conflict of attempting to serve both shareholders and a public mission. The new Congress and the next Administration must decide what role government in general, and these entities in particular, should play in the housing market. There is a consensus today that these enterprises pose a systemic risk and they cannot continue in their current form. Government support needs to be either explicit or non-existent, and structured to resolve the conflict between public and private purposes. And policymakers must address the issue of systemic risk. I recognize that there are strong differences of opinion over the role of government in supporting housing, but under any course policymakers choose, there are ways to structure these entities in order to address market stability in the transition and limit systemic risk and conflict of purposes for the long-term. We will make a grave error if we don't use this time out to permanently address the structural issues presented by the GSEs.
In the weeks to come, I will describe my views on long term reform. I look forward to engaging in that timely and necessary debate.
-30-
REPORTS
FHFA Director Lockhart Remarks on Housing GSE Actions
Fact Sheet: FHFA Conservatorship
Fact Sheet: Treasury Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
Fact Sheet: Treasury MBS Purchase Program
Fact Sheet: Treasury GSE Credit Facility
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
Elliott Wave Update
I was off by just a tad with yesterday's analysis.
I knew we were about to enter wave iii down, which is a very strong move down (collapse)...However, the Nasdaq was not quite done with wave ii, that was completed with this morning's rally off the oil news. But if you notice, we hit the high of the sesssion at 6:45 (pacific time) this morning and then sold off the rest of the day. The tick high today was 2413.11 at 6:45 a.m., which barely took out the tick high of 2412.84 from Thursday (8/28), but the important thing is that it took out the 8/28 high and immediately and violently reversed. Taking out the 8/28 high (2412.84) made for a much more satisfying a-b-c wave ii, and the action for the remainder of the day was virtually straight down, to a low of 2338.37, a drop of 74.74 points. If I'm correct we are directly in front of a major financial hurricane.
With the drop in the stock market came the predictable drop in interest rates. A pretty sizeable intraday reversal.
Here's a 1 min tick chart that goes back to 8/27 thru today (09/02). Today's action is to the right. The high in rates on the TYX came at 6:12 am, 3 minutes before the peak in the Nasdaq.
Monday, September 1, 2008
Nasdaq Technical Update
Back on August 6, I touch a bit on what I interpret as the current Elliot Wave count, i.e. the technical picture for the Nasdaq market. Putting this out, I completely understand that Elliot Wave strikes many, if not most, serious stock market followers as a discredited form of analysis. From my own experience, I've found that there are times that the Elliot Wave count is clear, and during those periods, it can be an extremely useful analytic tool for market timing.
Conclusion:
The Elliott Wave conclusion is that we are entering a period of extreme risk to both the stock market and the economy. I am using the Nasdaq Composite index for my analysis.
For those who are uninitiated in Elliot Wave analysis. The concept is essentially one of Waves of buying and selling that subdivide into varying degrees.
According to my analysis, we are currently entering into a 3rd of a 3rd of a 3rd wave down, which should provide maximum downside acceleration. Below is the Intermediate and Short Term picture.
Intermediate
Conclusion:
The Elliott Wave conclusion is that we are entering a period of extreme risk to both the stock market and the economy. I am using the Nasdaq Composite index for my analysis.
For those who are uninitiated in Elliot Wave analysis. The concept is essentially one of Waves of buying and selling that subdivide into varying degrees.
According to my analysis, we are currently entering into a 3rd of a 3rd of a 3rd wave down, which should provide maximum downside acceleration. Below is the Intermediate and Short Term picture.
Intermediate
Short Term - 5 Minute Bar Chart
Implications For Interest Rates: (All speculation) The implications for the Interest Rate market is actually quite complex. What I see happeneing is a short term implosion of the mortgage markets. In my opinion there is virtually no question that Freddie Mac is a "dead man walking", and that Fannie Mae is not much better off. However, the government will be forced to save one of the two, and they will save Fannie Mae.
In the whole scheme of things, neither Fanne nor Freddie's portfolio quality is all that bad. Not perfect, but not that bad. Their default rates are not terribly bad, considering where we are in the housing market cycle, although if you look at the default rates of loans originated from say 2005 through the summer of 2007, then yes, those loans definitely took on a substantial amount of needless risk. But despite that, at the core of the problems of both Freddie and Fannie, is not loan quality, per se. It is the loan quality GIVEN the amount of leverage they took on. They have taken on an amount of leverage that allows for virtually zero error toleranve regarding default/foreclosure rates. There is no margin for error built into their current system. Both Freddie and Fannie have constructed a portfolio risk profile that is sadly, very similiar to the model used by Long Term Capital Management, in my opinion. In order to chase return, both Fannie and Freddie have over-leveraged their loan portfolios at a time in the economic cycle that they should have been gradually de-leveraging. Simply put, both firms have been grossly mis-managed.
With all this as a background, in my opinion, the mortgage markets are about to enter THE period which the government has tried so hard to avoid...The Great Flush. We are about to see the mortgage markets seize up. We are going to see them seize up because the markets need to unravel this mess.
For example: Banks hold a great deal of Fannie Mae preferred stock in their portfolios, stock that is used to count towards their capital requirements with the Federal Reserve. As the value of this preferred stock gets written down, banks have less capital, thus less money to lend. I use this as an example, but it is truly the tip of the iceberg that we are headed towards.
There is the unwinding of CDOs that will take place. And this is a much more complicated process.
John Maudlin explains it quite well in his email newsletter of August 22, 2008:
Fannie, Freddie, and the Credit Crisis
Let's turn to Freddie and Fannie. There must be some people who think there is some way that the shareholders of Fannie and Freddie will not lose everything, as their shares actually trade. This just simply goes to show that you can fool some of the people some of the time. And as we will see, some of those people are very serious institutions.
It is almost a forgone conclusion that the US Treasury will have to step in and for all intents and purposes nationalize the two government-sponsored enterprises. The estimated losses in these two firms are far beyond what they could raise in a traditional market. And the longer the government waits, the worse the situation is likely to get.
Moody's downgraded the preferred stock in these firms to almost junk level because of the increased likelihood of "direct support" from the US Treasury, which, depending on the nature of the support, could wipe out both the holders of the common and the preferred. The preferred shares have already lost half their value since June 30 on speculation that an intervention would mean a stop in dividend payments (highly likely) and issuance of new preferred that would take preference over current preferred.
Interestingly, this would put more pressure on the banking system, as many banks hold the GSE preferred shares as assets, choosing to get a little extra return over traditional and more conservative assets. But then of course, Fannie and Freddie preferred were considered safe just a few months ago, with the best ratings from Moody's.
"Regional banks including Midwest Bank Holdings Inc., Sovereign Bancorp and Frontier Financial Corp., may have the most to lose. Melrose Park, Illinois-based Midwest has $67.5 million, or as much as 23 percent of its risk-weighted assets, in the preferred stock, while Philadelphia-based Sovereign owns about $623 million and Everett, Washington-based Frontier about $5 million." (Bloomberg)
It is doubtful that banks which hold these assets have written them down yet, but with a downgrade they will almost certainly be forced to do so in the near future. For the record, Fannie Mae has 17 classes of preferred stock, with more than 600 million shares outstanding. Freddie Mac has 24 classes of preferred stock, with about 460 million shares outstanding. The existing shares are trading worse than junk bonds, paying 17-19%.
And it may be a total write-off. It is hard to imagine how Treasury Secretary Paulson, or a new Treasury Secretary next year, could put US taxpayer money into the companies at risk without wiping out the current common and preferred shareholders. The justified outrage would be huge.
The basic problem is that without Freddie and Fannie the US mortgage market would go from crippled to moribund, if not dead. We have created a system that could not function in the short term without them, and the pain of allowing them to collapse would be another 1930s-style Depression, the era in which these firms were first created. They were never designed to take on the huge leverage they did, or to use hundreds of millions in lobbyist money and campaign contributions to create a massive payment scheme for management and shareholders. Congressional estimates are that this could cost US taxpayers $25 billion, a significant multiple of their current market caps.
Fannie and Freddie will not be able to raise capital on their own. At this point, why would any rational investor put that much money into a company with such a convoluted preferred share scheme, without government guarantees? That estimated loss assumes that the housing market does not get worse from this point. Losses could be much worse, or things could get better. Who knows? Why invest in something with so much uncertainty?
But there are more problems. You can't just take someone else's property, and that is what stock is, without some serious reasons. You almost are forced to wait for a crisis, otherwise shareholders would sue, saying that they suffered unnecessary losses. You can certainly expect the preferred shareholders to sue. That is why Paulson hired JP Morgan to figure out how to recapitalize the banks. I don't envy the people who are working on that one. Maybe there is some magic somewhere, but as we saw with Bear Stearns, at the end of the day it is all about adequate capital.
The GSE companies should be adequately capitalized and broken up into much smaller firms that would not be too big too fail in the future, and put under a regulator that would enforce reasonable leverage limits, with the profits going to pay back the US taxpayer before any profits or dividends are paid to any other future owners.
That is, if the government takes the two GSEs and puts capital (probably in the form of loans and guarantees) into them, which puts taxpayers at risk, then allows a public offering of the smaller entities to raise capital to repay the loans, any shortfall should be made up by the issuance of preferred shares, and the common shareowners would wait until the government loan was repaid before they would be eligible for a dividend.
And the people responsible for creating the leveraged systems, the board, et al., should be forced to resign. New top management all around.
The ultimate goal should be for taxpayers to get their money back and any guarantee, implicit or explicit, to be removed. No mortgage bank should ever again be allowed to be too big too fail.
Now, taken as a part of the total credit crisis, which will run to over $1 trillion (at least), $25 billion may not seem like a lot. But I hope this is a wake-up call for better regulations and safeguards.
And before I go, let me reiterate my call for regulators to force banks to move their credit default swaps to an exchange. The potential for a blow-up is serious, and it could dwarf the current credit crisis. I am not saying it will happen, just that it could. Even a low-risk event should be protected against. Credit default swaps are legitimate business transactions. They are very useful. They should just be put on an exchange, like futures or options, where there is 100% transparency as to counterparty risk.
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